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 Since occasion setting was identified as a type of learning independent of 
'simple' associative processes, a great deal of research has explored how occasion setters 
are established and operate. Initial theories suggested that they exert hierarchical control 
over a target CS→US association, facilitating the ease with which a CS can activate the 
US representation and elicit the CR. Later approaches proposed that occasion setting 
arises from an association between a configural cue, formed from the conjunction of the 
occasion setter and CS, and the US. The former solution requires the associative 
principles dictating how stimuli interact to be modified, while the latter does not. The 
history of this theoretical distinction, and evidence relating to it, will be briefly reviewed 
and some novel data presented. In summary, although the contribution of configural 
processes to learning phenomena is not in doubt, configural theories must make many 
assumptions to accommodate the existing data, and there are certain classes of evidence 
that they are logically unable to explain. Our contention is therefore that some kind of 
hierarchical process is required to explain occasion-setting effects. 
 








 Skinner (1938) was the first to suggest that performance of an operant response 
could come under the control of a discriminative stimulus. The idea spread to the 
cognitive behaviourist literature, with Holland (e.g. 1983; 1985) and Rescorla (e.g. 
1985; 1986) demonstrating the same effect in Pavlovian conditioning. Specifically, after 
training that a conditioned stimulus (CS) signalled an unconditioned stimulus (US), 
animals could confine performance of their conditioned response (CR) to the presence of 
a stimulus termed a modulator (Rescorla, 1985), a remote initiating stimulus (Jenkins, 
1985) or an occasion setter (OS; Holland, 1983).  
The truly novel finding was that the control exerted by the OS was independent 
of its associative properties. An OS could enhance performance of a CR that it could not 
itself elicit (Ross & Holland, 1981; Rescorla, 1985), even after OS extinction (Holland 
1989a), and pretraining the OS to signal the US impeded its ability to acquire control 
over the CR (e.g. Rescorla, 1986)
1
. This suggested that an OS's effect on behaviour did 
not rely on activation of the US, CS or CR - that it was not mediated by standard 
associative principles
2
. Two classes of theory emerged in response to this challenge to 
associative theory, which had until this point dominated accounts of learned behaviour. 
The first assumed additional, nonassociative principles must be invoked, giving rise to 
the US modulation, memory systems and hierarchical accounts. The second asserted that 
existing associative principles could explain occasion setting - provided combinations of 
stimuli could be represented and be subject to associative learning; this class includes 
the various versions of configural theory (e.g. Rescorla, 1972; Brandon, Vogel & 
Wagner, 2000; Pearce, 1987; 1994). As independent evidence for such configural 
                                                        
1 probably because such pretraining blocked acquisition of associative strength by the 
target CS (see Swartzentruber, 1995 for a review of related findings) 
2
 This should not be taken to imply that an OS may not also have associative properties 
that influence behaviour, simply that its action cannot be explained solely in those terms.  
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theories accumulated (e.g., Haselgrove et al., 2008; Pearce, et al. 2002; Williams, 
Sagness & McPhee 1994), this seemed the more parsimonious explanation, with the 
result that alternative accounts of occasion setting were eclipsed. This article will revisit 
evidence relating to these issues, and evaluate the extent to which associative theory can 
explain occasion setting, or whether additional nonassociative principles are required.  
We begin with the US Modulation and Hierarchical Accounts theories of 
occasion setting, for which the evidence, predominantly favouring the hierarchical 
account, is described. The Configural Learning alternative to the hierarchical approach, 
and its failure to account for evidence of US and CS/S specificity, is then considered; 
after this the evidence on Mechanisms of Occasion-Setter Formation which challenged 
the hierarchical approach is reviewed. Elaborations of Hierarchical and Configural 
Theories are then presented that can, with added assumptions, explain most of the 
existing data. Some Further Discriminating Evidence that could allow us to choose 
between these elaborated theories is discussed. We conclude by considering whether or 
not there is a need to suppose hierarchical processes to explain occasion-setting effects.  
  
US Modulation and Hierarchical Accounts  
 
 The first key theories were the US modulation (Rescorla, 1985) and hierarchical 
accounts (Holland, 1983). US modulation elaborated on the existing conceptualisation of 
a conditioned inhibitor (a stimulus predicting the omission of an otherwise expected US, 
and counteracting the effect of CSs predicting that US; e.g. Konorski, 1948; Rescorla, 
1969) as acting through suppression of activation in the US representation. The US 
modulation account proposed the complementary process, that a positive occasion setter 
lowers the activation threshold of the US representation, increasing its sensitivity to 
excitatory cues. This allows the CS to activate the US representation with greater ease in 
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the presence of the OS than in its absence. In contrast, the hierarchical account asserted 




Figure 1 about here 
 
 The accounts may be discriminated in terms of transfer. Suppose an OS signals 
that cs1 predicts US1 (Figure 1). If the OS facilitates activation of US1, it will enhance 
responding to cs2 associated with US1, but be without effect on cs3 associated with US2 -  
it is US-specific, not CS-specific. But if the OS enhances operation of the cs1→US1 
association it will have no effect on cs2, even if cs2 is also associated with US1: it will be 
both CS-specific and US-specific. Evidence suggests that occasion setters are both CS- 
and US-specific, and that the extent to which such specificity is observed is influenced 
by procedural factors (Swartzentruber, 1995). 
 
CS-specificity Many studies have shown that OS1 signalling that cs1 predicts US1 (OS1: 
cs1→US1), may control the CR to a cs2 that also predicts US1. But this transfer is 
typically incomplete: OS1 is rarely as effective with cs2 as with cs1 (e.g. Davidson & 
RescorIa, 1986; Holland, 1986, 1989b, 1989c; RescorIa, 1985; see Swartzentruber, 1995, 
for a review). This is inconsistent with US modulation: if OS1 facilitates activation of 
US1 it should modulate all CSs associated with US1 equally. But if cs2 were to suffer 
generalisation decrement through being combined with OS1, this could reduce 
responding to cs2, allowing US modulation to explain the incomplete transfer. This 
suggestion has not survived experimental test, however: Bonardi (1996) trained pigeons 
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 An alternative conceptualisation of the hierarchical account is that as an occasion-set 
CS is typically both reinforced and nonreinforced during training, it must have both 
excitatory and inhibitory associations with the US, and that the occasion setter inhibits 
the inhibitory association (Bouton & Nelson, 1998). However this account assumes that 
occasion setting is impossible if the occasion-set CS has no inhibitory strength, and there 
is evidence against this position (e.g. de Brugada et al., 1995; Hall & Honey, 1989). 
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that two occasion setters, OS1 and OS2 (a tone and flashing houselight) signalled 
reinforcement of keylights cs1 and cs2, respectively; cs1 and cs2 were nonreinforced 
when presented alone. In contrast cs3 and cs4 were reinforced regardless of whether they 
were accompanied by OS1 and OS2 or not (Table 1). Thus OS1 and OS2 were occasion 
setters for cs1 and cs2, but not for cs3 and cs4. Then responding to cs1, cs2, cs3 and cs4 
was examined in the presence of OS1 and OS2, in combinations that were the same or 
different from those of training. Incomplete transfer of occasion setting - more 
responding on same (OS1:cs1, OS2:cs2) than on different (OS1:cs2, OS2:cs1) trials - was 
observed. If this were due to generalisation decrement of cs1 when it was first presented 
with OS2 (and of cs2 with OS1) then the same effect would be expected on trials with cs3 
and cs4 - more responding on same (OS1:cs3, OS2:cs4) than different (OS1:cs4, OS2:cs3) 
trials. In fact numerically the opposite was observed
4
 (Figure 2). If incomplete transfer 
of occasion setting is not due to generalisation decrement, it implies that occasion setters 
are CS-specific, contrary to the US-modulation account (cf. Rescorla, 1991a; 1991b).  
Table 1 about here 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Memory Systems This line of work raised further issues: Holland (1989c) reported that 
OS1 signalling that cs1 predicts US1 (OS1: cs1→US1) modulated responding to cs2 only if 
it had been trained in an occasion-setting task. Conversely, OS1 modulated responding to 
a stimulus that signalled US2, but only if US2 had been involved in an occasion-setting 
task. Holland (e.g. 1989c) thus proposed the multiple memory systems account: (i) 
events involved in occasion-setting are represented in a different memory system from 
                                                        
4 This may be explained in terms of SOP (Wagner, 1981) as retrieval-generated priming 
of cs3 and cs4 on same trials reducing their ability to elicit the CR - cf., Honey, Hall & 
Bonardi, 1993. 
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those that have not, (ii) transfer is more likely between events within a memory system. 
However, many have reported substantial or complete transfer to CSs that have not been 
targets of occasion-setting, creating a problem for this theory (cf., Swartzentruber, 1995).  
 
Role of Stimulus Generalisation The literature on transfer reveals great variability in 
whether transfer of an occasion setter to a different CS is obtained, which is only partly 
attributable to the transfer CS's training history. Although transfer is often better to CSs 
that have also been targets of occasion setting, this may be understood in terms of 
simpler principles such as stimulus generalisation. For example, hierarchical theory 
assumes OS1, signalling cs1 predicts US1, acts directly on the cs1→US1 link, and so 
should have no effect on cs2→US1. But if cs1 and cs2 comprise unique and common 
elements (i.e. cs1 = csacsc and cs2 = csbcsc), then both cs1→US1 and cs2→US1 share a 
csc→US1 component, and OS1 could influence responding to cs2 via its effect on this 
csc→US1 association. That transfer is found more often in pigeons with visual keylight 
CSs than in rats with audio-visual cues (Swartzentruber, 1995) lends credence to this 
view, to the extent that stimulus generalisation is likely to be greater within a stimulus 
modality than between modalities. Such effects could also explain why transfer occurs 
more readily to occasion-set CSs. Generalisation may occur between occasion setters: 
OS1 acting on cs1→US1 may transfer more effectively to a cs2 that has been occasion-set 
by OS2 because of generalisation between OS1 and OS2; if cs2 has not been occasion-set 
this source of generalisation is not available. Also generalisation between CSs may not 
be based solely on physical similarity, but also via their common training history - 
acquired equivalence (Honey & Hall, 1989). For example, Bonardi and Hall (1994a) 
examined generalisation from occasion-set cs1 to two further cues cs2 and cs3, where cs2 
had also been the target of occasion setting, but cs3 had not (Table 2)
5
. After pairing cs1 
                                                        
5 cs3 was reinforced and extinguished (Table 2), to give it a similar training history to cs2 
without endowing it with occasion-setting properties. 
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with food they found greater generalisation of conditioned responding to cs2 than to cs3 
(Figure 3). They argued that the common training history of the occasion-set cues 
increased their similarity, which fostered selective transfer between them. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
Summary Transfer of occasion setting across CSs occurs, but it is typically incomplete. 
Transfer can be more substantial when the transfer CS had been occasion-set, but also 
occurs when it has not. These findings support the hierarchical account, which predicts 
occasion setters should be CS-specific, but that some degree of transfer can occur via 
stimulus generalisation, either between training and transfer CSs or between occasion 
setters, and based on stimulus similarity or stimulus training history. These findings are, 




 Configural theories were developed to explain performance on nonlinear 
discriminations such as negative patterning, A→US / B→US / AB→nothing. According 
to the standard associative assumption about summation, a compound stimulus is 
equivalent to the sum of its parts, so presenting A and B together sums their associative 
strengths. If CR is monotonically related to associative strength, accurate performance is 
impossible because responding to AB must be higher than to A or B alone. Configural 
theories abandon this summation assumption, but differ in how they conceptualise the 
stimulus compound. For example, Rescorla (1972) proposed that AB comprises the 
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elements of A and B plus a third, configural cue, x that is only present when A and B co-
occur; thus negative patterning becomes A→US / B→US / ABx→nothing, meaning x can 
acquire inhibitory strength and allow solution of the task. In contrast Pearce (1987; 
1994) proposed that although AB is distinct from A and B, generalisation can occur 
between them based on the proportion of elements they share; some have argued this 
effectively conceptualises the AB compound as a subset of the elements of A and B 
(Brandon, Vogel & Wagner, 2000). Brandon et al. (2000) combined these ideas in the 
replaced elements model, according to which some elements of A and B are replaced by 
elements unique to AB. All three can explain negative patterning, because all predict that 
associative strength accrued to A and B is not only source of responding on AB trials. 
 Configural theory can thus explain many of the facts about occasion setting by 
recasting an OS1: cs1→US1 / cs1→nothing discrimination as conditioning of a configural 
cue P created by co-occurrence of OS1 and cs1. If what has been conditioned is not OS1 
but P, manipulations of OS1's associative strength will leave the associative strength of  
P relatively intact. Configural accounts can also explain CS specificity effects: in the 
OS1: cs1→US1 / cs1→nothing discrimination, for example, the configural cue P is 
reinforced, and transfer of OS1 to cs2, in an OS1: cs2 compound occurs to the extent that 
there is generalisation between P and a second configural cue Q produced by co-
occurrence of OS1 and cs2. Many configural theories predict this would depend in part 
on the similarity of cs1 and cs2 — which, as we saw above, is what seems to be the case.  
 
US-specificity Both hierarchical and configural theories can thus explain occasion 
setting and its CS-specificity. But they make different predictions about US-specificity - 
whether OS1 trained as a signal that cs1 predicts US1 (OS1: cs1→US1) will act more 
effectively on other CSs that also predict US1. The hierarchical account predicts that 
occasion setters should be US-specific - yet Holland reported no sign of US specificity 
(perfect transfer) with a CS that predicted US2, provided US2 had also been involved in 
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an occasion-setting task (Holland, 1989c). However, US specificity has been reported 
even when US2 has been occasion-set: Bonardi, Bartle & Jennings (2012) trained rats on 
two positive-patterning tasks in which OS1 signalled reinforcement of cs1 with US1, and 
OS2 of cs2 with US2 (with cs1, cs2, OS1 and OS2 also presented alone - Table 3) and then 
examined the ability of OS1 and OS2 to transfer to cs3 and cs4, which predicted US1 and 
US2 respectively. Transfer was greater when the outcomes of the occasion setter and 
transfer CSs were the same, despite the fact that both US1 and US2 had been involved in 
occasion-setting tasks (Figure 4; see also Morell & Davidson, 2002).  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Figure 4 about here 
  
 These findings are not consistent with the predictions of standard configural 
theory which assumes that configural cues do not encode information about the USs that 
they signal. This means they cannot explain how OS1, signalling cs1→US1, can transfer 
more effectively to a stimulus that also signals US1 than to a stimulus that signals US2 
(Morell & Davidson, 2002; Bonardi et al., 2012). In both cases responding should be 
determined by the similarity of the trained configural cue OS1:cs1 to the OS1:cs2 cue 
present at test, neither of which is affected by the nature of the US. Given the theoretical 
importance of this issue, we conducted a further study in which16 rats were trained on 
two feature-negative discriminations with different USs (Table 4). OS1 and OS2 were 
visual (illumination of two 2.8-W jewel lights pulsed at 1 Hz, or of a 2.8-W bulb 
mounted inside the food magazine), cs1 and cs2 were auditory (white noise or 10-Hz 
clicker both at 73 dB) and US1 and US2 were either 2 sucrose pellets or .3 ml of 
groundnut oil (for complete description of apparatus see Bonardi et al., 2012). All 
stimulus presentations were 10-s in duration, and there was a 5-s trace interval between 
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OS offset and CS onset on compound trials; the intertrial interval (ITI) comprised a 
fixed 60s plus a variable interval with a mean of 30s, and on reinforced trials US 
delivery was delivered at CS offset. Each of the first 15 training sessions comprised, in a 
semi-random order, 8 OS1→nothing, 8 OS2→nothing, 8 cs1→US1, 8 cs2→US1, 16 OS1: 
cs1→nothing and 16 OS2: cs2→nothing trials
6
. In the next 18 sessions the OSs were also 
reinforced; each of these sessions comprised 4 OS1→US1, 4 OS2→US1, 4 cs1→US1, 4 
cs2→US2 trials, 24 OS1: cs1→nothing and 24 OS2: cs2→nothing trials. The final 6 of 
these sessions also included three trials with each of two test excitors cs3 and cs4, a 300-
Hz buzzer and a 2-kHz tone, both at 75dB, paired with oil and sucrose respectively. 
These sessions were otherwise identical to those of the preceding stage. The results from 
training are shown in Figure 5. The rats learned the task, responding more to cs1 and cs2 
when they were presented alone on reinforced trials than on nonreinforced trials when 
they were preceded by the OSs; ANOVA with trial type (CS reinforced or not) and 
session block as factors revealed main effects of trial type, F(1, 15) = 6.67, MSe = 16.38, 
p =.021, block, F(10, 150) = 16.36, MSe = 8.86, p < .001, and a significant interaction,  
F(10, 150) = 3.78, MSe = 1.82, p <. 001. Simple main effects analysis (using the pooled 
error term) revealed an effect of trial type on blocks 3, 7, 10 and 11, smallest F(1, 15) = 
4.62, MSe = 16.38, p = .048. Finally, the mean rate of responding to cs3 and cs4 was 
11.25 and 12.90 rpm for blocks 10 and 11 respectively.  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
Figure 5 about here 
 
                                                        
6 For half the animals the noise was reinforced with sucrose and the click with oil and 
for the remainder the reverse; for half of each of these subgroups the noise was preceded 
by the jewel light, and the click by the tray light on compound trials, and for the 
remainder the reverse. 
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 The ability of OS1 and OS2 to suppress responding to cs3 and cs4 was then 
evaluated: in four test sessions rats continued to receive three trials with each test excitor, 
plus 24 same trials in which either OS1 preceded cs3, or OS2 preceded cs4, and 24 
different trials on which these combinations were reversed (12 of each type). If OS1's 
effects were specific to US1 then OS1 should be more effective on same trials with cs3 
that also predicted US1, than on different trials with cs4 which predicted US2. The test 
session data are shown in Figure 6 in two, 2-session blocks; ANOVA performed on data 
from the OS trials with trial type (same or different) and block as factors revealed a main 
effect of trial type, F(1, 15) = 5.77, MSE = 2.29, p = .03, no effect of block, F < 1, and a 
significant interaction, F(2, 30) = 4.70, MSE = .459, p = .047. Simple main effects 
analysis revealed an effect of trial type on block 2, F(1, 15) = 5.72, MSE = 2.24, p = .03, 
although not on block 1, F(1, 15) = 1.00, MSE = 2.24, p = .33. Thus, just as in the 
positive patterning task, transfer was greater on same trials when the outcomes of the 
occasion setter and transfer CSs matched, despite the fact that both US1 and US2 had 
been involved in occasion-setting discriminations. Such US specificity cannot be 
predicted by the configural account, but is perfectly consistent with hierarchical theory. 
 
Figure 6 about here 
  
Specificity to CS/US combination Another key discriminator between the hierarchical 
and configural accounts is whether an OS1 which has signalled cs1→US1 and cs2→US2 
will be equally effective on cs1 if it is subsequently paired with US2, and on cs2 if it is 
paired with US1. If the occasion setter acts on the actual association between two 
specific events, as hierarchical theory predicts, then its potency should be substantially 
reduced if those associations are replaced by different ones: thus an occasion setter 
should be specific to a CS/US combination. In fact, evidence on this is mixed: Holland 
(1989c) trained rats on two feature-negative tasks with two USs (cs1→US1 / OS1: 
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cs1→nothing / cs2→US2 / OS2: cs2→nothing), and then the rats received pairings of cs1 
with US2, and cs2 with US1. Transfer of occasion-setting to these new cs1→US2, and 
cs2→US1 associations was complete — response rates to cs1 signalled by OS1, and to cs2 
signalled by OS2, were as high after cs1 and cs2 retraining as before — despite these 
event combinations never having been subject to occasion setting. This is inconsistent 
with the hierarchical account. However, other studies using different techniques have 
provided support for specificity to particular CS/US combinations. Bonardi & Ward-
Robinson (2001) trained pigeons on a switching task (Asratyan, 1961) with two USs: 
OSA signalled that cs1 was followed by US1, and cs2 by US2, while OSB signalled the 
opposite (see Table 5). OSA and OSB were diffuse auditory and visual cues, cs1 and cs2 
keylights, and US1 and US2 were red and white lentils. Then birds received Same trials, 
on which OSA and OSB signalled the same CS/US relations and a further keylight, S, was 
interposed between cs1 and cs2 and the USs, and also Different trials, which were 
identical except that S was replaced by keylight D, and the original CS/US relations 
were reversed. At test there was less responding to S than to D, a result which can be 
understood as a type of blocking. If OSA and OSB modulated specific CS/US pairings, on 
Same trials this would ensure that US delivery was fully predicted by cs1 and cs2, and 
thus that acquisition of associative strength by S would be blocked. But on Different 
trials A and B would not allow cs1 and cs2 to predict the outcomes that were delivered, 
making them surprising and thus able to support learning about D.  
 
Table 5 about here 
 
 Bonardi (2007) reported analogous results in a feature-negative task: rats were 
trained that cs1 and cs2 were reinforced with US1 and US2 respectively, except when they 
were signalled by OS (see Table 6). cs1 and cs2 were auditory, US1 and US2 oil and 
sucrose, and OS visual. Then the rats were trained on two feature-positive tasks with OS 
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as the feature. In Group Same OS signalled that cs1 was followed by US1, and cs2 by US2, 
but in Group Different these pairings were reversed. If in stage 1 animals learned that 
OS signalled specific cs1 → no US1 and cs2 → no US2 associations, then learning should 
be more difficult in Group Same, who unlike Group Different had to learn exactly the 
opposite of what they had learned in stage 2. That is what was observed (Figure 7). 
 
Table 6 about here 
 
Figure 7 about here 
 
Perceptual Interactions Another factor that discriminates between hierarchical and 
configural theory relates to the conditions fostering occasion-setting. Configural 
accounts assume that configural cues form most readily when there is a possibility for 
perceptual interaction between the to-be-configured cues - yet the conditions promoting 
formation of occasion setters are often not those that would be likely to facilitate such 
interaction (Holland, 1992). For example, configuring in a feature-positive task seems 
more likely when feature and target are presented simultaneously rather than serially. 
Yet Holland (1989b) demonstrated that in a feature-positive task with simultaneous OS 
and CS presentation (OS & cs→ US / cs→ nothing), the OS behaved more like a simple 
Pavlovian CS; its ability to promote responding to the CS transferred well to other CSs 
and was attenuated by counterconditioning. But if the OS preceded the CS during 
training (OS→cs→US / cs→nothing), it did not transfer to other cues and was not 
affected by counterconditioning - it was more like an occasion setter. Occasion setting 
was thus fostered by serial training procedures that were less likely to support configural 
learning. Configuring also seems more likely when OS and CS are of the same modality 
as this would allow perception of the two cues to interact more effectively. Yet Holland 
(1989b) found that simultaneous positive-patterning tasks (OS & cs→US / cs→nothing / 
 14 
OS→nothing) were easier to learn when OS and CS were of the same modality, whereas 
serial positive-patterning tasks  (OS→cs→US / cs→nothing / OS→nothing) were easier 
if OS and CS were of different modalities. Thus the serial tasks that foster occasion 
setting were easier to learn if configuring was less, rather than more, likely. Conversely, 
the simultaneous tasks that were less likely to result in occasion setting were easier to 
learn when configuring was more likely.  
 Other evidence from our laboratory, which addressed the ability of occasion 
setters to signal when a US is delivered (Bonardi & Jennings, 2007), casts further doubt 
on this perceptual interaction view. Rats were trained on a switching task with two 
occasion setters, OS1 and OS2, and two target stimuli cs1 and cs2. OS1 and OS2 were 10s 
in duration, and followed by cs1 or cs2, OS and CS being separated by a 5-s trace 
interval; cs1 and cs2 were both presented in long and short trials, 30-s and 6-s in duration 
respectively, giving four trial types, cs1 -short, cs1 -long, cs2 -short, cs2 -long. All CS 
presentations were immediately followed by food, but the OSs gave information about 
the delay to food delivery: OS1 signalled cs1 -short and cs2 -long trials, while OS2 
signalled cs1 -long and cs2 -short trials (OS1: cs1-short→US / OS1: cs2-long→US / OS2: 
cs1-long→US / OS2: cs2-short→US). Responding on probe trials (identical to training 
trials except that both cs1 and cs2 were presented for 90s and no US was delivered) 
indicated the rats had learned this task: they showed a peak of responding at around 6s 
after CS onset on short trials, and 30s after CS onset on long trials. These results could 
be compatible with a configural account if the trace of each OS and CS decayed in some 
time-dependent manner after its onset. Thus the rats might learn that on long trials on 
which OS1: cs2 and OS2: cs1 were reinforced, a configural cue of the trace of the OS 35s 
after its offset plus the trace of the CS 30s after its offset, was paired with food, and 
could control timed responding. We reasoned that these temporally sensitive configural 
cues would be disrupted if we altered the trace interval between the feature and the 
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target. Thus in a subsequent test we compared responding on training trials with that on 
trials in which the interval between OS offset and CS onset was increased from 5 to 29s. 
The rats continued to respond at the 'correct' time after CS onset - despite the fact that 
the OS trace at this point would have been completely different to that present during 
training. This is more consistent with a hierarchical-type account which allows each OS 
to signal a specific temporal relationship with a specific CS and outcome delivery. 
 
Summary Occasion setters are not only specific to the CS, but also to the US, with 
which they were trained. As to whether the occasion setter acts on a specific 
combination of a CS and US, the evidence is mixed; while transfer studies do not 
support this prediction, other types of task do. In combination with findings from 
operant tasks examining the specificity of discriminative stimuli and inhibitors to 
specific response-reinforcer associations (Colwill & Rescorla, 1990; Colwill, 1991; 
Bonardi & Hall, 1994b), these data confirm the view that occasion setters are 
association-specific in their action. This pattern of findings is not anticipated by 
configural theory, but is consistent with the hierarchical account. A further problem for 
configural theory stems from its implicit assumption that configuring is more likely 
when the to-be-configured cues may interact perceptually. In fact it seems that the more 
likely such interaction is, the less likely occasion setting is to occur. Also occasion-
setting-like behaviour can be maintained even when the potential configural cues are 
severely degraded. Thus, although the parsimony of a configural account is appealing, 
standard versions of such accounts have difficulty dealing with the empirical findings. 
 
Mechanisms of Occasion-Setter Formation 
 
 In comparison with the body of work on transfer, relatively few studies have 
explored the learning process by which occasion setting is established. Configural 
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accounts predict that formation of occasion setters should obey normal associative rules, 
provided the to-be-associated stimulus is the configural cue of OS and CS. But because 
the hierarchical account assumes that occasion setters act non-associatively, there is no 
reason why their formation should be governed by associative rules - and it is not clear 
what the alternative should be.
7
 One starting point was suggested by Mackintosh, who 
interpreted Skinner's original formulation by suggesting that the OS (or an operant S
d
) 
controls operation of CS→US or (R→US) through an associative-type process: "If the 
S
d
 provides subjects with information about the relationship between their actions and 
consequences, this is because it is associated not with those actions, nor with their 
consequences, but with a representation of the relationship between them." (Mackintosh, 
1983; pp.110-111). Thus although the OS's effect on behaviour is, by definition, not 
mediated by an association with either CS or US, its ability to exert this control is 
nonetheless the product of an association with the 'relationship' between them. Although 
this notion has persisted (e.g., Bonardi, 1996; Bonardi et al., 2012), it is not well 
specified; nonetheless, the assumptions on which it relies can be tested. For example, it 
predicts that the process by which an occasion setter forms should obey standard 
associative rules. Thus, assuming that the 'event' to be associated with the OS is the 
CS→US pairing, acquisition of occasion setting should show blocking. A corollary of 
this is that the CS→US association can be regarded as a unitary 'event' that can enter 
into associations. We will consider evidence relating to both of these proposals. 
 
Learning rules: Bonardi (1991) trained rats that during 3-min presentations of OSA, 5-
sec presentations of cs1 were followed by a food US; in OSA's absence cs1 was 
nonreinforced (OSA: cs1 →US / cs1 →nothing). In stage 2 animals were still trained with 
OSA and cs1, but OSA was presented in compound with OSB (OSAOSB: cs1→US / 
                                                        
7
 the exception is Rescorla's US modulation account; in a parallel with conditioned 
inhibition, he proposed that occasion setters were established in the presence of the 
reinforcement of a CS that possessed inhibitory strength. 
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cs1→nothing); OSB in compound with OSC also signalled reinforcement of cs2 (OSBOSC: 
cs2→US / cs2→nothing). Finally the ability of OSB to elevate responding to cs1 and cs2 
was evaluated. If in stage 1 OSA became associated with cs1→US, this would block 
formation of an association between OSB and cs1→US in stage 2; but as OSC was novel, 
cs2→US pairings would not be predicted by OSBOSC, and OSB's association with 
cs2→US would be unimpaired. If OSB's ability to act as an occasion setter, promoting 
responding to cs1 and cs2, was based on its association with cs1→US and cs2→US, then 
OSB should elevate responding to cs2 more than to cs1 - which is what was observed. 
Critically this cannot be due to blocking of the Pavlovian association between OSB and 
food, as this would affect responding to cs1 and cs2 equally. Configural theory could also 
explain these results via blocking. Generalisation between OSA: cs1 and OSAOSB: cs1, 
could curtail acquisition of associative strength by OSAOSB: cs1, reducing generalisation 
to OSB: cs1, which would thus elicit less responding at test than OSB: cs2   
 Related evidence has been generated in operant tasks. Colwill & Rescorla (1990) 
trained rats on two operant contingencies signalled by OSx (OSx: R1→US1  / 
R1→nothing/ OSx : R2→US2 / R2→nothing). In further training OSx was accompanied by 
either S or D. During OSx & S trials the same operant contingencies were in operation as 
before (OSx & S: R1→US1 / R1→nothing / OSx & S: R2→US2  / R2→nothing) whereas 
during OSx & D trials each response was paired with the alternative outcome (OSx & D: 
R1→US2  / R1→nothing / OSx & D: R2→US1 / R2→nothing). At test D was better able 
than S to elicit R1 and R2. This is interpretable as blocking by the occasion setter. 
Initially OSx becomes associated with R1→US1 and R2→US2. In stage 2, during OSx & S, 
R1→US1 and R2→US2 are fully predicted by OSx, blocking the ability of S to become 
associated with them. But when R1 and R2 are paired with the alternative outcome during 
OSx & D, the resultant contingencies are surprising, so D may become associated with 
them. Again configural theory would treat this as a case of unblocking - in stage 2 the 
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outcomes following OSx & S and R1, for example, are better predicted than those 
following OSx & D and R1. 
 
Summary Occasion-setter formation appears to conform to associative rules, as it shows 
blocking: the ability of OS1 to acquire control over cs1→US1 is blocked if a pretrained 
occasion setter for cs1→US1 is present. For the reasons we have outlined, this is not 
predicted by the hierarchical account unless it assumes that (i) each CS/US pairing may 
act as a unitary outcome independent of its constituents, and (ii) OSs acquire their 
occasion-setting properties through becoming associated with the CS/US pairing. 
 
Elaborations of Hierarchical and Configural Theory 
 
Elaborated Hierarchical Account Incorporation of hidden units into the hierarchical 
structure can help accommodate these assumptions. Bonardi et al. (2012) suggested an 
elaboration of the theory which assumes that when a CS→US association is established, 
a hidden unit is recruited that is specific to that association and linked to it via an 
asymmetric link. When the association is active, the hidden unit is activated in a normal 
associative manner (Figure 8 top panel; upward arrow), and any other stimulus that is 
present becomes associated with the hidden unit via standard associative learning; 
conversely activation of the hidden unit gates the ability of the CS to predict the US 
(Figure 8 top panel; round-headed arrow). Thus a cue that is present when the CS-US 
association is established becomes associated with its hidden unit, allowing presentation 




                                                        
8
 One possibility is that during CS→US formation, when the US is surprising, the 
hidden unit is recruited into A1 (cf. Wagner, 1980), and can support learning both as a 
'CS' and as a 'US'; once the CS→US association is formed, and the CS successfully 
predicts the US, the hidden unit enters A2, and can support learning as a CS, not a US. 
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Figure 8 about here 
 
 This modified theory can explain blocking of occasion setting (Bonardi, 1991): 
in stage 1 an association linking OSA to the hidden unit modulating cs1 →US forms and 
reaches asymptote. In stage 2 this hidden unit is now fully predicted by OSA, so  
formation of an association between the added OSB and the hidden unit is blocked, and 
OSB cannot acquire any occasion-setting properties for cs1 →US. In contrast, when OSB 
and OSC signal the new link cs2→US, a new hidden unit is recruited, with which both 
OSB and OSC can become associated. Thus OSB will control responding to cs2 but not cs1.  
 
Nature of the association representation A second corollary of this modified 
hierarchical account relates to whether a particular combination of events can enter into 
further associations. Evidence on this point has emerged from studies of acquired 
equivalence - the observation that the functional similarity between two cues can be 
enhanced if they share a common training history. Honey and Hall (1989) paired 
stimulus A with food, and then subsequently with shock. They observed that the fear CR 
elicited by A generalised more readily to a second stimulus B if it had also been paired 
with food. They attributed this to mediated conditioning (Holland, 1981; Ward-
Robinson & Hall, 1999): when A was paired with shock the representation of the food, 
with which it had previously been associated, was activated and became associated with 
the shock via a mediated conditioning process. Thus B, also able to activate the food 
representation, could also elicit fear at test via this food→shock association. This logic 
has been applied to occasion-setting. Honey and Watt (e.g. 1998; cf. Bonardi & Jennings, 
2009) trained rats on a switching task with four, 10-s auditory occasion setters, OS1, OS2, 
OS3 and OS4, and two 10-s visual CSs, cs1 and cs2. When preceded by either OS1 or OS3, 
cs1 was reinforced with food and cs2 was not, but when preceded by OS2 or OS4 these 
contingencies were reversed (see Table 7). Thus OS1 and OS3 signalled the same 
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contingencies between cs1, cs2 and food as did OS2 and OS4. Then OS1 was paired with 
shock while OS2 was nonreinforced, and finally fear of OS3 and OS4 was evaluated. In a 
parallel of the acquired equivalence result described above, they found greater fear of 
OS3, trained in the same manner as the shock-reinforced OS1, than OS4.  
 
Figure 9 about here 
 
 These results can also be explained by the elaborated hierarchical account, as it 
predicts that the hidden units relating to the cs1→USfood and cs2→nothing pairings will 
become activated during the shock conditioning stage. During initial training both OS1 
and OS3 become associated with the hidden units linked to the cs1→USfood  (Figure 9) 
and cs2→nothing links. When OS1 is then paired with shock, the hidden units linked to 
both cs1→USfood and cs2→nothing are activated and become associated with shock
9
. 
When OS3 is presented at test, as it can also activate these cs1→USfood  and cs2→nothing 
hidden units, it also indirectly activates the representation of shock and elicits fear.  
 This implies that the cs1→USfood  and cs2→nothing pairings should themselves 
become aversive as a result of this training, as use of these associations will activate 
their respective hidden units, and hence the shock representation. This prediction was 
tested in two further studies (Bonardi & Jennings, 2009). Rats were given the same 
training as in Honey & Watt's (1998) study, but in a final test fear of the cs1→USfood and 
cs2→nothing pairings was evaluated: rats were trained to respond for food on an operant 
baseline, and while they were responding they experienced presentations of cs1 and cs2; 
in one study both were paired with food, and in the other both were nonreinforced. The 
rate of operant responding after each of these pairings was compared to baseline rates of 
responding before CS onset. If the above analysis is correct, animals should show more 
                                                        
9
 In terms of the suggestion made above, if use of the association recruits the hidden unit 
into A2, it can enter further learning as a CS, and thus become associated with shock. 
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fear after cs1→USfood than after cs2→USfood trials, but conversely more fear after 
cs2→nothing than cs1→nothing trials. This was what was found (Figure 10).  
 
Table 7 about here 
 
Figure 10 about here 
 
Extended Configural Theory This elaboration of the hierarchical account has allowed 
it to expand its range of predictions, and a similar strategy was applied to configural 
theory. Honey and Watt proposed an 'extended' configural theory (e.g. Honey & Watt, 
1999; Honey & Ward-Robinson, 2002) to allow encoding of the US representation, and 
hence account for US specificity effects. It assumes that configuring occurs not through 
perceptual interaction, but via hidden units (e.g. Pearce, 1994). An associative structure 
is supposed comprising input and output units with an intervening set of hidden units. A 
given CS or US will uniquely correspond to a specific input or output unit respectively, 
but CS/US pairings can also recruit a hidden unit that links their input and output units 
(Figure 8 bottom panel). This effectively allows encoding of the US in the configural 
cue: for example, if OS1 signals that cs1 predicts US1, OS1 and cs1 will become 
associated with the same hidden unit p that is also linked to the US1 outcome (Figure 
11a). This explains why OS1 might show US-specificity, and transfer better to cs2 if it is 
associated with US1 than with US2. Responding will occur to the extent that the OS1: cs2 
compound can activate a hidden unit; thus if cs2 is paired with US1 it will also be linked 
to the critical hidden unit p, and elicit more responding than if it were paired with US2 
and thus linked to a second hidden unit q. Note that this prediction assumes that two 
sources of activation to p have a greater effect than one source of activation to each of p 
and q (Figure 11a (i) and (ii)). If such hidden units are recruited during normal 
conditioning with a single CS, then this leads to the prediction that responding should 
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always be greater to a compound of two CSs that predict the same US than when they 
predict different USs. Evidence on this is mixed, however: some studies find more 
Pavlovian summation when the predicted USs match (Rescorla, 1999), others more 
responding when they differ (Watt & Honey, 1997), and others no difference (Ganesan 
& Pearce, 1988). Nor can this account clearly predict CS/US specificity: if OS1 signals 
cs1 →US1, and OS2 signals cs2 →US2, hidden units p and q form (Figure 11b). If cs1 
were then paired with US2, and cs2 with US1 (dotted arrows) the model would 
presumably predict that both CSs will become associated with both hidden units; thus 
without further assumptions there is no reason to predict that OS1: cs1 would be any 
different in its effect on behaviour than OS1: cs2. 
 
Figures 11a and 11b about here  
 
 Because it is an associative model, the extended configural account can explain 
why occasion-setter formation obeys associative-type principles, provided the rules 
governing association of input and hidden units are subject to standard cue competition. 
For example, blocking of occasion setting could be explained (Bonardi, 1991): if OSA 
and cs1 are linked to the same hidden unit as the US, then as long as the same hidden 
unit is recruited in both stages of training, OSA will be able to block acquisition of 
associative strength by OSB for this hidden unit, impairing OSB's ability to become an 
occasion setter. The model could also explain the results reported by Honey and Watt 
(1998) and Bonardi & Jennings (2009; Figure 12). Because both OS1 and OS3 signal that 
cs1 predicts USfood, all these events will become associated with p, and so on. When OS1 
is subsequently paired with shock, p is activated and also becomes associated with 
shock; thus anything that can also activate p - such as OS3 - will also access the shock 
representation and elicit fear. However, explaining Bonardi & Jennings' (2009) results 
requires the additional assumption that presentation of USfood can also activate the 
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hidden unit via a feedback mechanism (Figure 12, dotted arrows). Thus presentation of 
cs1 and USfood provides two sources of activation to the p hidden unit associated with 
USshock, while presentations of cs2 and USfood each activate only one hidden unit that is 
linked to OS1 (p and q); thus as two sources of activation to one hidden unit have a 
greater effect than one source of activation to two different hidden units, presentations of 
cs1 and USfood will produce more fear than presentations of cs2 and USfood. 
 
Figure 12 about here 
 
Summary Extended configural theory overcomes the inability of more traditional 
configural theories to explain US specificity, but at some expense. Current formulations 
do not specify the conditions required for recruitment of hidden units, and the account 
must also make additional assumptions - for example, about the effect of summing two 
sources of activation to one hidden unit, or how US presentation can also activate its 
associated hidden unit. Elaborated hierarchical theory must also make assumptions, 
about the properties of the associations linking the association to its hidden unit, the 
rules governing how the hidden unit is activated and when it can undergo learning. 
Given this potential impasse, a different means is required to discriminate between these 
approaches. We now turn to some different classes of evidence that might achieve this. 
 
Further Discriminating Evidence 
 
OS/CS symmetry One fundamental distinction between the elaborated hierarchical and 
extended configural theories lies in the role of the occasion setter. Configural theories 
assume only the processes of associative learning: activity in a stimulus representation 
can only influence activation of a second stimulus via an association between them. 
Thus there is no qualitative distinction between the action of the OS and CS, because 
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there is only one way that one stimulus can interact with another
10
. In contrast 
hierarchical theory proposes that CS representations can also interact in a nonassociative 
manner, that allows an occasion setter to facilitate the flow of activation in an 
associative link. Thus the hierarchical account assumes that the OS plays a qualitatively 
distinct role from that of a CS in controlling behaviour.  
 We examined this distinction in two studies (Bonardi et al., 2012). Rats were 
trained on two positive-patterning discriminations with two occasion setters OS1 and 
OS2, two conditioned stimuli cs1 and cs2 and two USs US1 and US2 (Table 8). According 
to extended configural theory this should result in formation of two hidden units, one 
linking OS1 and cs1 to US1, and another linking OS2 and cs2 to US2 (cf. black arrows 
Figure 11b). The OSs were visual, the CSs auditory, and the USs sucrose and oil. 
Stimulus presentations were of 10-s duration, and OS offset was separated from CS 
onset by a 5-s trace interval. The rats were also trained with two types of transfer 
stimulus (i) two separately trained test excitors cs3 and cs4 which, like the CSs, were 
auditory and were immediately followed by either US1 or US2; and (ii) two separately 
trained pseudo-occasion setters POS1 and POS2 which, like the OSs, were visual and 
were paired with either US1 or US2 after a 15-sec trace interval.  
 
Table 8 about here 
  
Figure 13 about here 
 
 The studies differed in their test procedure. In one we examined performance on 
trials that were identical to the compound training trials except that cs1 and cs2 were 
replaced by one of the test excitors, cs3 or cs4. The constituents of these test compounds 
                                                        
10
 Although earlier theories, as we saw above, allowed for inhibitors to modulate 
activation of representations rather than activating anything directly, later authors have 
rejected this possibility (Mackintosh, 1983). 
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either both signalled the same outcome (OS1: cs3 / OS2: cs4) or different outcomes (OS1: 
cs4 / OS2: cs3). Consistent with the US specificity predicted by both elaborated 
hierarchical and extended configural theory, we found more responding to cs3 and cs4 on 
same than on different trials. In the second study the test trials were identical to the 
compound training trials except this time OS1 and OS2 were replaced by one of the 
pseudo-occasion setters POS1 and POS2. These trials were again classified as either 
same (POS1: cs1 / POS2: cs2) or different, (POS1: cs2 / POS2: cs1). According to extended 
configural theory, as there is no qualitative distinction in the ability of OS and CS to 
activate the hidden unit, replacing either element of the trained compound will produce 
the same effect, more responding on same than different trials; but this was not observed. 
Mean rates of responding on same (s) and different (d) trials in each of the 2-trial blocks 
of each test were converted to a ratio of form s/d and averaged; ratios greater than 1 
indicate more responding on same than different trials. The data, in Figure 13, suggest 
that the ratios exceede 1 in the first study (p = 0.27), but not in the second; ANOVA 
revealed a significant effect of experiment, F(1,30) = 4.74, MSe = .493, p = .04. 
 We interpreted these findings as supporting the hierarchical view that OS and CS 
do not play functionally equivalent roles. Although the CS acts in a standard associative 
manner, the OS does not. Thus replacing the CS of the training compound with a 
separately trained stimulus retains the occasion-setting nature of the task in a way that 
replacing the OS with a separately trained pseudo-occasion setter does not, meaning the 
hierarchical account need not predict the same pattern of responding in both tests. In 
contrast, the extended configural theory must predict that both tests are functionally the 
same: both OS1 and CS1 are linked to the same hidden unit, and so replacing either of 
these cues should produce more responding if the replacement cue is associated with the 
same US as the cue that remains. Moreover, we noted above that this prediction relies on 
specific assumptions about the activation thresholds for the hidden units, which means it 
has difficulty explaining the finding that summation is greater when the pair of CSs 
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predict two different USs than when they predict the same US (Watt & Honey, 1997). It 
is thus of interest that in the final study of the series we combined simple CSs predicting 
the same or different outcomes, and found less responding when the USs matched
11
. A 
dissociation in the pattern of responding to CS compounds whose components predict 
the same, or different, outcomes depending on whether one of those components is an 
occasion setter does not support the extended configural account. 
 
Parsing of the Association Another study attempted to discriminate the two theories in 
a different way. In a task similar to that described above two groups of 8 rats received 
training trials in which cs1 and cs2, 10-sec presentations of a 74-dB,10-Hz clicker, or the 
illumination of the tray light, were each paired with one of two USs; for half the rats the 
click was paired with sucrose and the traylight with oil, and for the rest the reverse. They 
also received nonreinforced compound trials on which a third cue OS, the 10-s 
illumination of a 2.8-W jewel light, signalled simultaneous presentation of cs1 and cs2 
after a 5-s trace interval (OS: cs1&cs2 →nothing / cs1 →US1 / cs2 →US2).
12
  The data 
from the discrimination training phase are presented in Figure 14; ANOVA showed that 
both groups learned the discrimination, F(1, 14) = 17.82, p = .001; smallest p involving 
the group factor: F(1, 14) = 1.06, p = .32. Then, to equate pairings of cs1 and cs2  with the 
two USs before the test, rats received reverse training in which cs1 was paired with US2 
and cs2 with US1
13
. The groups did not differ in this phase, and responding remained 
high (20.1 and 24.9 rpm for Groups Same and Different respectively on the final 2-
session block; see below); ANOVA with group and 2-session block as factors revealed 
                                                        
11
 We tested the effect of signalling cs1 and cs2 with cs3 and cs4, again either in same 
(cs3→cs1 and cs4→cs2) or different (cs3→cs2 and cs4→cs1) combinations, and found 
significantly higher responding on different trials in the first test block, p = 0.24. 
12
 There were 56 trials scheduled per session, with a variable inter-trial interval (mean of 
75s, range of 60-90s), and 26 training sessions in this stage; each comprised 4 cs1 →US1 
and 4 cs2 →US2 trials, and in all but the first 10 sessions also 48 OS: cs1&cs2 →nothing 
trials.  
13 This training comprised 18 further sessions, each of 8 cs1 →US2 and 8 cs2 →US1 trials. 
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nothing significant; the smallest p was associated with the interaction, F(8, 112) = 1.07, 
p = .07, and the effect of group was not significant, F < 1. 
 
Figure 14 about here 
 
Table 9 about here 
 
 Finally the rats were divided into two groups, and trained on two feature-positive 
discriminations. In Group Same the OS signalled reinforcement of cs1 with US1, and cs2 
with US2, the opposite of what had been the case during the initial feature-negative 
training when OS signalled cs1 would not be followed by US1, and cs2 would not be 
followed by US2. In contrast, for Group Different the CS→US pairings during feature-
positive training were reversed, so test training did not directly contradict the feature-
negative discrimination in this way
14
. 
 The extended hierarchical account assumes that during feature-negative training, 
cs1→US1 and cs2→US2 associations form, and that one hidden unit is recruited for each. 
Although it does not specify how negative occasion setters form, let us assume for 
simplicity that a stimulus that is present when cs1 is paired with the unexpected omission 
of US1 acquires modulatory control over a cs1→ noUS1  association, which reduces the 
extent to which cs1 can predict US1. Thus the OS would acquire inhibitory control over 
the cs1→US1 and cs2 →US2 associations, and this control would not be compromised 
when different cs1→US2 and cs2 →US1 associations were subsequently formed. Thus 
Group Same, who had to learn the opposite of the relations in operation during feature-
                                                        
14 There were two phases in this stage; in the first, in which the feature-positive 
discriminations were acquired, comprised 10 sessions, each of 24 OS →nothing, 12 cs1 
→nothing, 12 cs2 →nothing, and for Group Same 4 OS: cs1 →US1 4 OS: cs2 →US2 
trials; the second, in which performance was tested, comprised 12 sessions identical to 
those of the first phase except that there could be 2, 4 or 8 OS: cs1 →US1 and OS: cs2 
→US2 trials per session. For Group Different US1 and US2 were reversed. 
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negative training at test, would perform less effectively at test than Group Different, as 
only the former group would have to overcome the inhibitory modulation over these 
specific associations that was established in the feature-negative training stage. 
 Extended configural theory instead predicts that initial negative-patterning 
training would result in hidden unit p linking cs1 and US1, and q linking cs2 and US2. The 
model assumes that learning about non-reinforced trials is governed by an excitatory 
association from the hidden unit to a no-US representation (e.g., Allman, Ward-
Robinson & Honey, 2004; cf. Konorski, 1967). Thus OS, cs1 and cs2 should be equally 
associated with a no-US1 representation via hidden unit r, and a no-US2 representation 
via the hidden unit s (Figure 15). When cs1 and cs2 are each paired with the alternative 
USs, they will become linked to q and p respectively, resulting in the associative 
structure shown in Figure 15. It is clear from the symmetry here that there would be no 
good reason to predict why animals in Group Same should learn their feature-positive 
test discrimination any less effectively than those in Group Different.  
 
Figure 15 about here 
 
 The results of this experiment may be seen in Figure 16. Levels of responding 
declined gently over the course of testing, presumably because the number of reinforced 
trials per session was on average lower than it had been in the previous phases (see 
footnote 12). While Group Different performed accurately, responding more on 
reinforced trials on which cs1 and cs2 were signalled by OS than when cs1 and cs2 were 
presented alone, Group Same showed the opposite pattern. ANOVA with group, trial 
type (reinforced and nonreinforced) and blocks as factors revealed a significant 
interaction between group and trial type, F(1, 14) = 7.47, p = .02, and simple main 
effects revealed that the effect of trial type was significant in Group Different, F(1, 14) = 
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6.37, p = .02, but not in Group Same, F(1, 14) = 1.80, p = .20. The results were, 
therefore, in accord with the predictions of the hierarchical account.
15
   
 
Figure 16 about here 
 
Conclusions: Do We Need a Hierarchical Theory? 
  
 We have reviewed theories of occasion setting which fall into two classes, those 
that require modification of existing associative learning principles, and those that do 
not. In the former category the US modulation and memory systems accounts were 
largely unsupported by evidence on the CS- and US-specificity of occasion setting, 
leaving the hierarchical account as the main contender. Configural theories fall into the 
second class, but are unable to explain why occasion setters are US-specific without 
considerable modification, resulting in extended configural theory. Conversely, 
hierarchical theory could not explain the apparent constraints on occasion-setter 
formation without elaboration of its associative structure. Both theories must therefore 
make a number of assumptions to account for the existing data, and more precise 
specification of the conditions required for recruitment of hidden units is required, 
especially for extended configural theory. Future work could usefully compare the 
degree to which these two relatively informal approaches can be expressed as 
computational models, and explore any concrete predictions that are generated in this 
way. Equally, the extent to which the more formal models that have been developed (cf. 
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 It should be noted that there is an inevitable confound in this experiment, as the cs1→
US1 and cs2 →US2 associations were always learned before the cs1→US2 and cs2 →US1 
associations. Thus the occasion-set relations of the test were learned first for Group 
Same but second for Group Different, and this could also be responsible for the 
differences at test. However, if the reverse-order training preceded the negative 
occasion-setting training there would be no guarantee that OS acquired negative 
occasion-setting properties over cs1→US1 and cs2 →US2 and not to some extent over cs1
→US2 and cs2 →US1 - fatally compromising the logic of the experiment. 
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Kutlu & Schmajuk, 2012; Vogel, Ponce & Wagner, this volume) can accommodate the 
key classes of evidence described here could be explored. An alternative means of 
discriminating the two approaches could focus on their underlying assumptions - the 
theories differ fundamentally in how they conceptualise the roles of OSs and CSs - and 
this may provide grounds for discriminating between them. We reported two of our own 
studies that address this distinction, and the results were consistent with hierarchical 
theory's predictions. It is also possible that neuroscientific approaches may be able to 
dissociate the two mechanisms.  
 Of course these two approaches should not be taken as mutually exclusive. There 
is evidence outside the occasion-setting literature that supports the existence of 
configural cues - although whether such evidence can be accommodated within the 
perceptual interaction version of configural theory, or requires the extended configural 
interpretation, is unclear. The question is thus more one of whether an additional notion 
of hierarchical control is also required. We have argued in this article that it is, and that 
any general associative theory that is able to explain occasion-setting effects will need to 
incorporate such a mechanism. In our view the development of properly formalised 
mechanisms for hierarchical control, and their incorporation into a more general model, 
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 Table 1: Design of Bonardi (1996). OS1 and OS2 were 10-s presentations of diffuse 
auditory or visual stimuli; cs1, cs2, cs3 and cs4 were 5-s presentations of different 
keylights, which immediately followed OS presentations on compound trials. USfood 




Same              Different         Target 
 
OS1: cs1 → USfood 
cs1 → nothing 
OS2: cs2 → USfood 
cs2 → nothing 
 
OS1: cs3 → USfood 
cs3 → USfood 
OS2: cs4 → USfood 
cs4 → USfood 
OS1: cs1                   OS1: cs2                    cs1 




OS1: cs3                   OS1: cs4                 cs3 






















Table 2: Design of Bonardi & Hall, 1994a. OS1 was a 3-minute presentation of a 
visual cue, cs1, cs2 and cs3 were 10-s auditory cues. Food only followed cs1 and cs2 
when they occurred during OS1 and OS1 respectively; unaccompanied cs1 and cs2  









Table 3: Design of Bonardi Bartle & Jennings (2012) Experiment 1. OS1 and OS2 
were 10-s visual stimuli, cs1, cs2, cs3 and cs4 10-s auditory stimuli, and US1 and US2 

























OS1: cs3           OS1: cs4           cs3    







TRAIN 1 TRAIN 2 TRANSFER 
TRAIN 
TEST 



















OS1: cs3      OS1: cs4 
OS2: cs4       OS2: cs3 
 
Table 4: OS1 and OS2 were 10-s visual stimuli, cs1, cs2, cs3 and cs4 10-s auditory 
stimuli, and US1 and US2 sucrose or groundnut oil. There was a 5-s trace interval 







TRAIN 1 Same           Different TEST 
 
OSA: cs1 →US1 
OSA: cs2 →US2 
cs1 →nothing 
cs2 →nothing 
OSB: cs1 →US2 
OSB: cs2 →US1 
OSA: cs1 S →US1       OSA: cs1 D →US2 
OSA: cs2 S →US2       OSA: cs2 D →US2 
 
OSB: cs1 S →US2       OSA: cs1 D →US1 






Table 5: Design of Bonardi & Ward-Robinson (2001). OSA and OSA were 10-s 
presentations of diffuse auditory or visual stimuli; cs1, cs2, S and D were 5-s 
presentations of different keylights, and immediately followed OS presentations on 









OS: cs1 →nothing 
 
cs2 →US2 
OS: cs2 →nothing 
 
Group Same 
OS: cs1 →US1  cs1 →nothing 
OS: cs2 →US2  cs2 →nothing 
 
Group Different 
OS: cs1 →US2  cs2 →nothing 




Table 6: Design of Bonardi, 2007. OS was a 10-s visual stimuli, cs1 and cs2 10-s 
auditory stimuli, and US1 and US2 sucrose or groundnut oil. There was a 5-s trace 





TRAIN REVALUE OS TEST ASSOCIATION TEST 
OS1: cs1 →USfood 
OS1: cs2 →nothing 
OS3: cs1 →USfood 
OS3: cs2  →nothing 
 
OS2: cs2 →USfood 
OS2: cs1  →nothing 
OS4: cs2 →USfood 


















cs1 →nothing   
cs2 →nothing 
 
Table 7: Design of Bonardi & Jennings (2009). OS1, OS2, OS1 and OS4 were 10-s 
auditory cues, cs1 and cs2 10-s visual cues; CS onset coincided with OS offset on 






TRAIN 1 TRAIN 2 TRANSFER 
TRAIN 
TEST 
Same        Different 




OS2: cs2 →US2 
OS2 →nothing 
cs2 →nothing 











POS1  →US1 
POS2  →US2 
 
 
OS1: cs3      OS1: cs4 
OS2: cs4      OS2: cs3 
 
POS1: cs1     POS1: cs2 
POS2: cs2     POS2: cs1 
 
Table 8: Bonardi, Bartle & Jennings (2012) Experiments 3a and 3b: OS1, OS2, POS1 
and POS2 were 10-s visual stimuli, cs1, cs2, cs3 and cs4 10-s auditory stimuli, and US1 
and US2 sucrose or groundnut oil. There was a 5-s trace interval between OS and CS 









Table 9: OS was a 10-s visual stimulus, cs1 and cs2 10-s auditory or visual stimuli, 
and US1 and US2 sucrose or groundnut oil. There was a 5-s trace interval between OS 
and CS presentations on compound trials. 
 










Group Same      
OS: cs1 →US1      OS: cs2 →US2   
cs1 →nothing      cs2 →nothing 
Group Different 
OS: cs1 →US2      OS: cs2 →US1 





Figure 1: According to hierarchical accounts an OS signalling that cs1 will be 
followed by US1 acts either on the US1 representation (i; e.g., Rescorla, 1985) or on 
the cs1→US1 link (ii, e.g., Holland, 1983). The accounts differ in their predictions 
about the OS’s action on a stimulus cs2 that has signalled US1; neither predicts that 
the OS will have an effect on a stimulus cs3 that signals US2. The pointed arrow 
indicates an associative link; round-headed arrow indicates facilitation of (i) 
activation of US1 representation or (ii) transmission of activation via cs1→US1  



























Figure 2: Results of Bonardi 1996 Experiment 2: Group mean response rates to the 
occasion-set cs1 and cs2 and the non-occasion-set cs3 and cs4 on same (OS1:cs1, 
OS2:cs2, OS1:cs3, OS2:cs4) and different (OS1:cs2, OS2:cs1, OS1:cs4, OS2:cs3) trials or 
when presented alone. Error bars show within-subject confidence intervals 



































Figure 3: Results of Bonardi & Hall, 1994a Experiment 1. Mean response rates to cs2 
(which had been occasion-set) and cs3 (not occasion-set, but conditioned and 
extinguished) in the generalisation test.  Error bars show within-subject confidence 








































Figure 4: Group mean response rates to cs3 and cs4 on same, different and target 
trials in the two test session blocks of Bonardi, Bartle & Jennings (2012) Experiment 
1. Error bars show within-subject confidence intervals (Cousineau, 2005). For further 






























Same      
OS1:cs3 
OS2:cs4 
Different     
OS1:cs4 
OS2:cs3 







Figure 5: Mean response rates during cs1 and cs2 when nonreinforced and signalled 
by OS1 and OS2 (OS1: cs1-, OS2: cs2-) or when presented alone and reinforced (cs1 
→US1, cs2→US2), and also during the occasion setters (OS1 and OS2 ) and the trace 
interval separating OS and each cs on compound trials, during the training stage. 
Error bars show within-subject confidence intervals (Cousineau, 2005). For further 





































Figure 6: Mean response rates to cs3 and cs4 on same, different and target alone 
trials during the two test session blocks. Error bars show within-subject confidence 

































Different   
OS1:cs4  
OS2:cs3 
Target           







Figure 7: Group mean rates of responding to cs1 and cs2 when signalled by OS 
(OS:cs) and presented alone (cs) in the test session of Bonardi, 2007 Experiment 2.  
Error bars show within-subject confidence intervals calculated separately for each 





























Figure 8: Top panel: Associative structure according to the elaborated hierarchical 
account. Pointed arrows indicate associative links; the round-headed arrow indicates 
the facilitation of activity transmission through the associative link; the circle denotes 
a hidden unit. Formation of the association recruits the hidden unit.  
Bottom panel: Associative structure according to the extended configural account.  
Pointed arrows indicate associative links; the circle denotes a hidden unit. For 













Figure 9: Associative structure arising from Honey & Watt's (1998) experiment 
(Table 7), according to the elaborated hierarchical account. Both OS1 and OS3 
become associated with the hidden unit of the cs1→USfood association during initial 
training. When OS1 is paired with shock the hidden unit becomes associated with the 
shock, thus allowing future presentations of both OS3 and cs1→USfood to activate the 
shock representation via the hidden unit. Pointed arrows indicate associative links; 
the round-headed arrow indicates the facilitation of activity transmission through the 




















Figure 10: Mean suppression ratios for responding after cs1→USfood and cs2→USfood 
and cs1→nothing and cs2→nothing in the test sessions of Bonardi & Jennings (2009; 
Experiments 1 and 2 respectively). Error bars show within-subject confidence 
intervals (Cousineau, 2005) calculated separately for each group. For further details, 


















































 Figure 11a: The extended configural theory account of US specificity. Associative 
structures arising in feature-positive discriminations in which OS1 signals 
reinforcement of cs1 with US1, and (i) cs2 also predicts US1 or (ii) cs2 predicts US2. 
Pointed arrows indicate associative links; circle denotes hidden unit. 
 
Figure 11b: Associative structures arising in feature-positive discriminations in 
which OS1 signals reinforcement of cs1 with US1, OS2 signals reinforcement of cs2 
with US2, and then cs1 is paired with US2 and cs2 is paired with US1. Pointed arrows 

































































Figure 12: Associative structure arising from Honey & Watt's (1998) experiment 
(Table 7). According to the extended configural account, both OS1 and OS3  signal 
that cs1 predicts USfood , so OS1 OS3 and cs1 become associated with p, which is also 
linked to USfood. Pointed arrows indicate associative links; circles denote hidden units. 
US presentation can also activate the hidden unit with which it is linked via a 



























































Figure 13: Ratio of same/different responding in Experiments 3a and 3b of Bonardi, 
Bartle & Jennings, 2012. In Experiment 3a test trials compared responding during 
transfer excitors cs3 and cs4 signalled by the trained occasion setters OS (same OS1: 
cs3 and OS2: cs4 or different OS1: cs4 and OS2: cs3), and in Experiment 3b during the 
CSs from the occasion-setting discrimination cs1 and cs2 signalled by pseudo-
occasion setters POS (same POS1: cs1 and POS2: cs2 or different POS1: cs2 and POS2: 
























OS: cs3 cs4 






Figure 14: Group mean response rates during cs1 and cs2 on reinforced cs1→US1 
cs2→US2 and nonreinforced OS: cs1&cs2 →nothing trials. Error bars show within-
subject confidence intervals (Cousineau, 2005) calculated separately for each group. 
































Same                  
cs1/cs2 -->US 
Different              
cs1/cs2 -->US 
Same                  
OS: cs1&cs2- 








Figure 15: Initial training results in cs1 and cs2 becoming linked to US1 and US2 
respectively by two hidden units, p and q. On nonreinforced trials two further hidden 
units are established, one linking OS, cs1 and cs2 with noUS1, and another linking 
these same stimuli with no US2. Finally cs1 and cs2 are each paired with the 
alternative outcomes, becoming linked to q and p respectively. Pointed arrows 














































Figure 16: Group mean response rates during the second test phase. cs1 and cs2 
occurred on reinforced trials, when they were signalled by the occasion setter (OS: 
cs) and on nonreinforced trials, when they were presented alone (cs). Error bars 
show within-subject confidence intervals (Cousineau, 2005) calculated separately for 




























Same          
cs1 cs2 
Diff              
cs1 cs2 
Same           
OS: cs1  
OS: cs2 
Diff              
OS: cs1  
OS: cs2 
